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The Buck Stops Here: Peaceable
Repossession Is a Nondelegable Duty
Robinson v. Citicorp National Services, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A secured party has the right to take possession of the collateral if the
debtor defaults.2 "In taking possession a secured party may proceed without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace. . ,. Relying
on this language, secured creditors often repossess collateral without judicial
process. Many times they hire independent contractors to repossess the
collateral from defaulting parties. Secured creditors believe they are shielded
from liability by hiring independent contractors to perform repossessions.4
Robinson v. Citicorp National Services, Inc. makes it unlikely that a
secured creditor will avoid liability in Missouri by hiring an independent
contractor to repossess collateral. 5 Robinson imposes a nondelegable duty on a
secured creditor to peaceably effect repossession.6 This is bad news for secured
creditors but even worse news for potential borrowers.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Citicorp National Services, Inc. hired M & M Agency, Inc. to repossess
Clarence Robinson's automobile after he became unable to pay the required
monthly installments pursuant to his purchase contract.7 Employees of M & M
Agency, Inc. found the car parked on property owned by Odell and Marie
Robinson and attempted to repossess the automobile.' Odell, who was present
at the time of the repossession, repeatedly told the employees to get off the
1. 921 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
2. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-503 (1994).
3. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-503 (1994).
4. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 370 (1965).
5. Robinson, 921 S.W.2d at 54-55.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 53. Citicorp and M & M had previously entered into an independent
contractor agreement whereby M & M would provide repossession services for Citicorp
on a per job basis. Id. Citicorp had requested that M & M repossess the automobile
parked on the property owned by the Robinsons pursuant to that agreement. Id. Clarence
Robinson purchased the automobile from Bommarito Hyundai. Id. Under the terms of
the purchase contract, the automobile was to be paid for in monthly installments. Id.
Bommarito held a security interest in the automobile and subsequently assigned its
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property to no avail. 9 An alleged trespass and breach of peace ensued, and Odell
suffered a heart attack and died."0
Marie Robinson subsequently filed suit against Citicorp in the Circuit Court
of St. Louis County, asserting claims for wrongful death, breach of peace, and
trespass." Robinson claimed that Citicorp was liable for the actions of M & M
Agency, Inc.' 2 Citicorp moved for summary judgment, asserting that M & M
Agency, Inc. was an independent contractor for whom Citicorp bore no
responsibility. 3  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Citicorp. 4 In reversing the trial court, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District held that Section 400.9-503 of the Missouri Revised Statutes
specifically imposes a nondelegable duty on a secured creditor pursuing
nonjudicial repossession to pursue it in a peaceable manner. 5 Robinson is the
first decision in Missouri to consider the issue of whether a secured creditor may
delegate liability for wrongful death, breach of peace, and trespass by hiring an
independent contractor to perform the repossession pursuant to Section 400.9-
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Robinson also asserted claims for breach of peace and trespass against M
&M. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 54. In support of its motion, Citicorp made specific references to the
depositions of Roger Martin, the president of M & M, and Kenneth Lee Reichardt, an
employee. Id. Citicorp also made specific references to the independent contractor
agreement, as well as to responses made by M & M to its requests for admissions. Id.
Robinson filed a response to Citicorp's motion "essentially denying its substantive
paragraphs" and making specific references to the independent contractor agreement, her
deposition, and the depositions of Martin, Reichardt, and Steven Brinkman, an employee
ofM&M. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 54-55. Missouri has adopted Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial
Code at Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-503 (1994). Id. at 54. Section 400.9-503 provides in
pertinent part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-503 (1994).
The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the duty to peacefully repossess property
was "specifically imposed" on a secured party, and, therefore, seems to have utilized the
exception stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965) that prohibits the
delegation of a specific duty imposed by statute or contract. Robinson v. Citicorp Nat'l
Servs., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 424 (1965)). Section 424 provides that a person under a statutory duty to
provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of another is liable for injuries
to the other person caused by a contractor's failure to provide the necessary safeguards
or precautions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965).
[Vol. 63
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The term "independent contractor" is defined in many different ways.'"
Courts usually define an independent contractor as one who contracts to do
certain work according to the independent contractor's own methods, without
being subject to the control of the employer, except as to the product or result
of the work.'9 Generally, an employer is not liable for physical harm caused to
a third party by an act or omission of an independent contractor or his servants.0
However, courts recognize some exceptions to the general rule.2' The
exceptions generally fall into the following three categories: (1) nondelegable
duties of the employer arising out of an employer's obligation, either by contract
or law, to a particular person or to the public; 22 (2) negligence of the employer
in selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor; 23 and (3) work which is
specially, peculiarly, or inherently dangerous.2 a
16. Robinson, 921 S.W.2d at 54.
17. Id. at 52.
18. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors § 1 (1968).
19. See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors § 1 (1968); see also Ross v. St.
Louis Dairy Co., 98 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. 1938) (holding a trucking company to be an
independent contractor where it contracted with a dairy company to transport milk from
the latter's plant to the city and deliver it to the dairy company's place of business);
Baldwin v. Gianladis, 159 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942) (stating an independent
contractor is one who acts under an independent employment contract to work according
to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer, except as
to the result of his work).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 370 (1965). The trial court
undoubtedly relied on this rule in granting summary judgment for Citicorp. Robinson v.
Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
21. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410-429 (1965) (citing the complete
list of exceptions).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 410-429 (1965). This exception is
commonly referred to as the nondelegable duty exception. See infra notes 25-34 and
accompanying text.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410-429 (1965). This exception is
usually referred to as the negligent hiring exception. Although this exception is not
discussed in this Note, the reader should recognize that the negligent hiring exception has
been used to hold employers vicariously liable. See, e.g., Sullivan v. St. Louis Station
Assocs., 770 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Springdale Gardens v. Countryland
Dev., Inc., 638 S.W.2d 813, 816-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 410-429 (1965). This exception is
referred to as the inherently dangerous activity exception. Although this exception is not
discussed in this Note, the reader should recognize that the inherently dangerous activity
1998]
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The nondelegable duty exception 25 creates employer liability for the
negligence of an independent contractor, even if the employer is not actually at
fault.26 A nondelegable duty arises when, for reasons conceming public policy,
the employer is not permitted to shift the responsibility for the proper execution
of the work to the independent contractor.27 A nondelegable duty may be
created when a statute or administrative regulation imposes a duty upon an
employer overseeing particular types of work to provide specific safeguards or
precautions for the safety of others.28 Ordinarily, the language of the statute or
ordinance must subject the employer to a definite obligation.29 Therefore, the
duty imposed must be specifically identified in the statute.30 Usually, a general
duty created under a statute or ordinance is nondelegable because no specific
safeguards or precautions are set forth in the statute.3'
Two types of statutes and regulations are in the nondelegable duty
category.3 2 The first type imposes an absolute duty upon those doing the work
exception has been used to hold employers vicariously liable. See, e.g., Kelly v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the practice of emergency
medicine not to be an inherently dangerous activity); Nance v. Leritz, 785 S.W.2d 790
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding as inherently dangerous activity requiring a subcontractor
working on the exterior of a building to use staging rather than a ground-supported
extension ladder). The Missouri Supreme Court established the test for determining
whether an activity is inherently dangerous in Smith v. Inter-County Telephone Co., 559
S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1977). The court stated:
[I]f the doing of the work necessarily causes dangers which must be guarded
against, then the employer must see to it that such dangers are guarded
against, and cannot relieve himself by casting this duty on an independent
contractor. If, however, the work is dangerous only by reason of negligence
in doing it, then the liability falls only on the independent contractor. In the
one case the doing of the work creates danger and requires active care to
counteract the danger. In the other there is no danger unless created by
negligence.
Id. at 522 (quoting Carson v. Blodgett Constr. Co., 174 S.W.2d 447, 448 (1915)).
25. See supra note 22; see also infra notes 26-34.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 411-439 (1965).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 411-439 (1965).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1965).
29. 41 AM.JUR.2D Independent Contractors § 38 (1968). "[T]he terms of the
statute ... in question must be of such a tenor as to subject [the employer] to a definite
obligation...." Williamson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 265 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Mo.
1954). -
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965).
[Vol. 63
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to provide for the specified safeguards or precautions.33 The second merely
imposes a duty to use reasonable care to provide the specified safeguards.34
The Alabama Supreme Court was the first of two state supreme courts to
address the issue of whether a secured creditor pursuing nonjudicial repossession
has a nondelegable duty to do so peaceably. 35 In General Finance Corp. v.
Smith,36 a debtor defaulted on a loan and the secured creditor hired a
repossession service to retrieve the collateral.37 During the repossession, the
service breached the peace.38 The plaintiff sued, and the defendant bank claimed
that it was not liable because the repossession service was an independent
contractor.39
The Alabama Supreme Court was the first court to hold that torts arising
from self-help repossession should be dealt with through the use of the
nondelegable duty exception. 40 The court recognized a nondelegable duty,
absent a specific contractual or statutory duty.4 ' The court identified the
nondelegable duty exception,42 but admitted that the legislature did not set out
specific "safeguards or precautions which a secured party must take in order to
effect a peaceful repossession. 43 However, the court held that by implication,
"a secured party is under a duty to take those precautions which are necessary
at the time to avoid a breach of the peace."44 Prior to General Finance,
Alabama, like most other jurisdictions, only utilized the nondelegable duty
exception when an employer, either by contract or law, owed certain specific
obligations to the public.
45
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965). If the duty is absolute,
the employer is subject to liability for the failure of the contractor to provide the required
safeguard or precaution. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965). Liability
is imposed upon the employer even though the contractor exercised all reasonable care
to supply the particular safeguard or precaution. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 424 (1965).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965). If the duty is one of
reasonable care, the employer is subject to liability only if the contractor has failed to
exercise such care. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965).
35. General Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 505 So. 2d 1045 (Ala. 1987).
36. Id. at 1045.




41. Id. at 1047-48.
42. Id. at 1047. The court stated: "An employer who by contract or law owes a
specific duty to another cannot escape liability for a tortious performance by reason of
the employment of an independent contractor." Id.
43. Id. at 1048.
44. Id.
45. This exception was first recognized in Montgomery Gas-Light Co. v.
Montgomery & Eastern Railway, 5 So. 735 (Ala. 1889). In Montgomery, a company
1998]
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Minnesota courts next recognized the peaceful repossession of an
automobile as a nondelegable duty. In Nichols v. Metropolitan Bank,46 the
placed a freight car on a side track near the plaintiff railway company's main track. Id.
at 736. Four of the plaintiff's moving rail cars collided with the freight car and were
destroyed. Id. The court held that the contract concerning the use of the side track
created a duty on the part of the defendant to keep it free from obstructions. Id.
Montgomery recognized that a contractual nondelegable duty could be created, making
an employer liable for the acts of an independent contractor. Id. at 737.
This nondelegable duty was expanded in Alabama Power Co. v. Pierre, 183 So. 665
(Ala. 1938). In Pierre, the plaintiffs purchased electrical equipment from the defendant
power company. Id. at 667. The power company agreed to install the equipment in the
house without cost to the Pierres. Id. at 668. The power company hired an independent
contractor to install the electrical equipment. Id. The house was then destroyed by a fire
caused by the negligent installation of the electrical equipment. Id. In holding for the
Pierres, the court stated: "[D]efendant cannot escape responsibility for the negligent
performance of the installation upon the theory that Bailey was an independent
contractor. By contract this installation was a non-delegable duty on defendant's part so
far as these plaintiffs were concerned .... ." Id. The court thus held that a nondelegable
duty could be created by contract even where the independent contractor performed the
contract at no extra charge. Id.
Alabama's nondelegable duty exception was further developed in State Farm
Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Dodd, 162 So.2d 621 (Ala. 1964). In Dodd, State Farm
hired an independent contractor to repair Dodd's automobile. Id. at 626. The repairs
were made negligently, resulting in Dodd's death., Id. Based upon the insurance policy,
the Alabama Supreme Court held that State Farm had a contractual duty to repair the
automobile which could not be delegated to a third party. Id.
Robertson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 413 So. 2d 1064 (Ala. 1982), resulted in another
development of the nondelegable duty exception in Alabama. In Robertson, the plaintiff
filed an action against the city, the humane society, and the society's employee for killing
his cow. Id. at 1065. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the duty of animal control
was a delegable duty given to the humane society as a independent contractor. Id. at
1066. The court defined a nondelegable duty as "a specific duty imposed on the
municipality by statute." Id. The development in Robertson reiterated the fact that in
order for a duty to be nondelegable under the exception to the general rule of employer
nonliability, the statutory duty must be specific.
46. 435 N.W.2d 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). In Nichols, the plaintiff purchased an
automobile for his daughter Kim and financed it with a loan obtained from Metropolitan
Bank. Id. at 638. Mr. Nichols defaulted on the car loan, and the bank hired an
independent contractor, R.J. Control Service, to repossess the vehicle. Id. R.J. Control
sent two employees named Nelson and Vedder to seize the car. Id. at 638-39. Nelson
and Vedder waited at the Nichols residence and approached Kim Nichols as she drove
the car into her driveway and demanded that she surrender the car. Id. at 639. She
refused, and Nelson reached through the open car window and grabbed Nichols' hand as
she held the keys in the ignition. Id. Nelson and Vedder took the keys from Nichols and
drove the car away. Id. Gary and Kim Nichols brought an action against Metropolitan
Bank, R.J. Control Service, and Nelson and Vedder, asserting that they were entitled to
damages for injuries to Kim Nichols' hand and wrist upon several theories, including
assault and battery. Id. Metropolitan Bank moved for summary judgment, asserting that
[Vol. 63
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Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the duty to peacefully repossess property
was "specifically imposed on a 'secured party."' The court utilized the exception
contained in Section 424 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts47 that prohibits
the delegation of a specific duty imposed by statute or contract.48 Like Alabama,
prior to Nichols, Minnesota courts only used the nondelegable duty exception
when an employer, either by contract or law, owed certain specific obligations
to the public.49 The Nichols decision thus extended the nondelegable duty
exception to include a non-specific duty not to breach the peace imposed by
general statutory language.
The Texas Supreme Court was next to address the issue of whether a
secured creditor pursuing nonjudicial repossession has a nondelegable duty to
do so peaceably.50 In MbankEl Paso N.A. v. Sanchez,5 when Yvonne Sanchez
defaulted on a note secured by her car, the secured creditor, MBank El Paso,
it was not liable for the damages because R.J. Control Service was an independent
contractor, and the lower court granted the motion for summary judgment. Id.
47. Id. at 640. The court stated: "[A] person under a statutory duty to provide
specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of another is liable for injuries to the
other person caused by a contractor's failure to provide the necessary safeguards or
precautions." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965)). Instead of
implying that the code specified a statutory duty, as in Alabama, the Minnesota court
interpreted the statute as specifically imposing a duty on a secured party. Id. at 641. The
analysis is somewhat different, but the court reaches the same result. Id.
48. Id.
49. An early case creating an exception to the general rule of employer non-liability
was Pacific Fire Insurance Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Manufacturing Co., 277 N.W. 226
(Minn. 1937). In Pacific Fire, the Kenny Boiler Company contracted to manufacture
steel plates and attach them to a water tank. Id. at 227. Kenny delegated the task of
attaching the plates to a third party. Id. The tank fell, and the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that Kenny owed Pacific Fire a duty to use due care in its work and that this duty
was nondelegable. Id. at 228. Thus, the Pacific Fire court based its decision on a
specific contractual duty. Id.
This exception was expanded in Brasch v. Wesolowsky, 138 N.W.2d 619 (Minn.
1965). Wesolowsky contracted with Brasch to construct the Brasch's home, but a third
party completed the foundation. Id. at 621. Considerable cracking later appeared in the
foundation, and, thereafter, Brasch sued the general contractor, Wesolowsky, for the work
performed by Wesolowsky's independent contractor. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a general contractor owed a home buyer a nondelegable duty to use due care in
the construction of a house. Id. 623. The court found that such a duty arose as a result
of the contract between the parties. Id.
The nondelegable duty exception was also applied in Westby v. Itasca County, 290
N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 1980), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held: "A principal is
liable for the negligent performance of a nondelegable duty by an independent contractor,
and road maintenance is such a duty." Id. at 438.
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hired El Paso Recovery Service to repossess the car." During the repossession,
Sanchez got into the car and locked the doors. El Paso Recovery continued the
repossession, towed the car to a repossession yard, and left Sanchez in the lot. 4
Sanchez filed suit against MBank, alleging that MBank was liable for the torts
of El Paso Recovery.55 MBank maintained that it was not liable because it
delegated its duty not to breach the peace to an independent contractor. 6
The court rejected MBank's argument, citing to General Finance,57
Nichols,58 and the Restatement of Torts for the proposition that parties under a
statutory duty to provide certain safeguards cannot delegate such a duty to
independent contractors. 9 The court found that Section 9.503 of the Texas
Business and Commercial Code imposed a duty on MBank to take precautions
for public safety during a nonjudicial repossession. 6' Therefore, because a
breach of the peace occurred during the repossession of collateral for MBank,
MBank was liable even though an independent contractor committed the
breach.6'
The Texas Supreme Court recognized that a secured creditor has a strong
interest in seizing the collateral securing a defaulted loan.62 However, the court
balanced the interest of the secured creditor against society's interest in the
public peace, stating: "If a creditor chooses to pursue self-help, it must be
expected to take precautions in doing so. If this burden is too heavy, the creditor
may seek relief by turning to the courts. 63 When MBank chose to repossess the
collateral without the assistance of the judicial system, "it assumed the risk that
a breach of the peace might occur."64 As was true of the courts of Alabama and
Minnesota, prior to MBank, the Texas Supreme Court had never extended the
nondelegable duty exception to include any non-specific statutory duty.65 Texas
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The lot was surrounded by a fence and the gate was locked. Id. There was
also a doberman pinscher guard dog roaming around the lot. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. General Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 505 So. 2d 1045 (Ala. 1987).
58. Nichols v. Metropolitan Bank, 435 N.W.2d 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
59. MBank El Paso, N.A. v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. 1992).
60. Id. at 152. Texas has adopted Section 9-503 of the UCC. See TEx. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 9-503 (West 1990).
61. MBank El Paso, 836 S.W.2d at 153.
62. Id. at 154.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Texas courts frequently applied the nondelegable duty exception to impose
liability on railroads that hired independent contractors. For example, in Gulf Coast &
San Francisco Railway v. Stephenson, 273 S.W. 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925, no writ), a
plaintiff incurred damages to his crops when livestock entered his land through a opening
[Vol. 63
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dealt with torts arising from self-help repossession under the theory of negligent
hiring.66
In Sammons v. Broward Bank,67 the Florida Court of Appeals arrived at the
same conclusion when it addressed the issue of whether a secured creditor could
avoid liability by hiring an independent contractor to accomplish the
61
repossession. In Sammons, Broward Bank financed the purchase of an
automobile by Sammons using the same automobile for collateral.69
Subsequently, after Sammons defaulted on the loan, the bank hired an
independent contractor to repossess the car and a breach of peace ensued.7" The
court approved and adopted the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
in Nichols v. Metropolitan Bank7 on this issue.72 Therefore, the court held that
in his fence. The railroad was held responsible for the crop damage even though an
independent contractor actually tore down the length of fence. Id. at 295. The court
decided that the statutory duty to give notice upon tearing down fences was nondelegable.
Id.
In Quanah, Atlantic & Paci'fic Railway v. Goodwin, 177 S.W. 545 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915, writ denied), the court applied the nondelegable duty exception with regard to a
statutory duty to repair. In Quanah, the railroad owed the general public a statutory duty
to keep street crossings in good repair during construction of tracks across the streets. Id.
at 547. The statute granted a railway the right to cross streets with its tracks but imposed
upon it the duty of keeping the crossings in repair. Id. The court held that the specific
duty to repair could not be shifted to an independent contractor. Id.
The court in Quanah based its decision on an earlier railroad case, Texas Midland
Railroad v. Johnson, 50 S.W. 1044, 1045 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, writ ref d), which held
that the statutory duty to repair roadways could not be delegated to a third party. The
statute at issue in Johnson expressly required a railroad to restore a highway to its former
condition after laying track across it. Id. The temporary right of way, built for the public
while the highway was under construction, was left in a dangerous condition. Id.
Because of the specific statutory duty, the court held that the duty to keep the detour road
in good repair was nondelegable. Id.
66. See supra note 23.
67. 599 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. While the Sammons were in church, the independent contractor slashed the
tires of the car. Id. After church, the Sammons drove away before noticing the flat tires.
Id. The independent contractor, following in another car, then began to play "tag" with
the Sammons and kept pursuing them. Id. Eventually, the police interjected and arrested
Denver Sammons for aggravated assault and leaving the scene of an accident with
injuries, based on the independent contractor's claim that Sammons tried to run over
them. Id.
71. 435 N.W.2d 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
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a secured creditor cannot avoid liability for a breach of the peace by hiring an
independent contractor to perform the repossession.73
Eight other jurisdictions have ruled on self-help repossession cases.74 No
court has ruled that a secured creditor can delegate the duty to avoid a breach of
the peace imposed by Section 9-503 of the UCC to an independent contractor.75
Until Robinson, no Missouri court had ever decided whether the duty to
repossess without a breach of the peace was nondelegable.76
73. Id. at 1019.
74. See Henderson v. Security Nat'l Bank, 140 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1979); Fulton v.
Anchor Sav. Bank, 452 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Massengill v. Indiana Nat'l
Bank, 550 N.E.2d 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); DeMary v. Rieker, 695 A.2d 294 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1997); Mauro v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 374
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); McCall v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Cottam
v. Heppner, 777 P.2d 468 (Utah 1989); Ragde v. Peoples Bank, 767 P.2d 949 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1989). '
75. DeMary, 695 A.2d at 301. However, two lengthy dissents in MBank El Paso,
N.A. v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 155-60 (Tex. 1992) (Cook & Hecht, JJ., dissenting),
outlined several theories against nondelegability. In the first Sanchez dissent, Judge
Cook maintained that the court created strict liability in an area in which it was
inappropriate and that the rule would unfairly disadvantage secured creditors who hire
independent contractors to carry out repossessions. Id. at 155 (Cook, J., dissenting). In
the second dissent, Judge Hecht argued that the rule would cause innocent creditors to
incur liability in connection with actions of parties over which the creditors had no
control and that these added expenses would lead to a substantial increase' in the cost of
credit. Id. at 159 (Hecht, J., dissenting). No state court ruling on the issue of whether the
duty to repossess without a breach of the peace is nondelegable has accepted the
dissenting arguments in Sanchez. DeMary, 695 A.2d at 301.
76. Prior to Robinson, Missouri courts, like those of Alabama, Minnesota, and
Texas, had only used the nondelegable duty exception when an employer, either by
contract or law, owed certain specific obligations to the public. In Williamson v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 265 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Mo. 1954), the court stated: "If
a duty imposed by statute is relied upon, '[i]n order that the employer may be charged
with liability [based on a nondelegable duty] the terms of the statute... in question must
be of such a tenor as to subject him to a definite obligation . . . .' Id. (quoting
Annotation, Liability of Enployer as Predicated on the Ground of His Being Subject to
a Non-delegable Duty in Regard to the Ityured Person, 23 A.L.R. 984, 989 (1923)).
Missouri courts have frequently applied the nondelegable duty to impose liability
on railroads that hired independent contractors. For example, in McGolderick v. Wabash
Railway, 200 S.W. 74, 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917), the court held that it was the duty of the
railroad to "keep down the undergrowth along its right of way." The court stated that
because the duty was imposed upon the railroad by statute the railroad could not escape
liability for injuries to persons caused by the negligence of an independent contractor
performing the work. Id.
In Bluni v. Airport Terminal Services, Inc., 762 S.W.2d 67, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988),
the court held that the city of St. Louis had a continuing nondelegable duty to assure that
airplane fuel was dispensed safely and that fuel trucks were adequately marked and
labeled. The Robinson decision extended the nondelegable duty exception to include a
[Vol. 63
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The Missouri Court of Appeals recognized that the issue of whether a
secured creditor can delegate liability for breach of the peace by hiring an
independent contractor to perform a repossession had not been addressed in
Missouri.77 Therefore, the court looked to decisions of otherjurisdictions made
under the same UCC provision for guidance. 8 Judge Simon, relying heavily on
General Finance Corp. v. Smith,7 9 Nichols v. Metropolitan Bank, ° MBank El
Paso, N.A. v. Sanchez,8 ' and Sammons v. Broward Bank, 2 wrote the opinion of
the court8 3 The issue, as stated by the Missouri Court of Appeals, was "whether
a secured creditor can delegate liability for wrongful death, breach of peace, and
trespass by hiring an independent contractor to perform the repossession
pursuant to Section 400.9-503. "84
Citicorp relied on Scott v. Ford Motor Credit Corp.85 for the proposition
that "a secured creditor who hires a collection agency as an independent
contractor cannot be held liable for the collection agency's negligent acts in
repossessing an automobile." 6 The Missouri Court of Appeals distinguished
Scott from the present case, indicating that the court in Scott did not address the
issue of whether Section 400.9-50387 created a nondelegable duty on the part of
a secured party to peaceably repossess.8
In holding that peaceable self-help repossession is a nondelegable duty, the
court first stated that Missouri had adopted Section 9-503 of the Uniform
Commercial Code as codified in Section 400.9-503.89 The court went on to note
non-specific duty, i.e., to not breach the peace, imposed by general statutory language.
Robinson v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs, Inc., 921 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
77. Robinson, 921 S.W.2d at 54.
78. Id. See supra notes 35-73 and accompanying text.
79. 505 So. 2d 1045 (Ala. 1987). See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
80. 435 N.W.2d 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). See supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text.
81. 836 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1992). See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
82. 599 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). See supra notes 67-73 and
accompanying text.
83. Robinson v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 52, 52 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996).
84. Id. at 54.
85. 706 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In Scott, the independent contractor
hired by the secured party repossessed the truck without breaching the peace; therefore
the issue presented in the present case was not addressed. Id. at 460.
86. Robinson, 921 S.W.2d at 55.
87. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-503 (1994).
88. Robinson v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996).
89. Id. at 54.
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that Section 400.9-503 is substantially similar to Section 9-503 of the UCC.90
Judge Simon explained that "where there is a paucity of Missouri case law
interpreting a provision of the UCC, courts of this state look for guidance to
decisions of other jurisdictions made under the same provision."'" Judge Simon
identified several cases92 from other jurisdictions holding that Section 9-503 of
the UCC imposed a nondelegable duty on a secured creditor to repossess
peaceably. 93 The court noted that these jurisdictions each adopted pertinent
statutes regarding a secured party's duty to peaceably repossess. These statutes
are substantially similar to Missouri's Section 400.9-503. 94
The court of appeals held that "the duty to repossess property in a peaceable
manner is specifically imposed on a secured party by the UCC."95 Therefore, the
court held that a secured party may not delegate to third persons, including
independent contractors, the secured party's duty to peaceably repossess. 96
Judge Simon explained that the rule is intended "to protect debtors and other
persons affected by repossession activities. 97 He went on to state that "the
conditional nature of the secured party's self-help remedies indicate that a
secured party party must ensure there is no risk of harm to the debtor and others
if the secured party chooses to repossess collateral by self-help methods."98
90. Id. See supra note 15.
91. Robinson, 921 S.W.2d at 54. See also Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Co., 533
S.W.2d 257, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that where there is a paucity of Missouri
case law interpreting a certain provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, Missouri
courts should look for guidance to decisions of other jurisdictions interpreting the same
provision).
92. See supra notes 35-73 and accompanying text.
93. Robinson v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 54-55. Missouri has adopted Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-503 (1994); see supra note 16. The Missouri Court of
Appeals held that the duty to peacefully repossess property was "specifically imposed on
a secured party, and, therefore, seems to have utilized the exception stated in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965) that prohibits the delegation of a
specific duty imposed by statute or contract. Robinson, 921 S.W.2d at 54. Section 424
provides that a person under a statutory duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions
for the safety of another is liable for injuries to the other person caused by a contractor's
failure to provide the necessary safeguards or precautions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 424 (1965).
96. Robinson, 921 S.W.2d at 54-55.
97. Id. at 54.
98. Id. at 55.
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According to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Section 400.9-503 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes imposes a nondelegable duty on a secured party
engaged in self-help repossession to conduct the repossession without breaching
the peace.99 This holding seems to be based on the realization by courts early in
American jurisprudence that the preservation of peace is far more important than
an owner regaining possession of a chattel."1' Although a secured creditor has
a strong interest in obtaining collateral from a defaulting debtor, this interest
"must be balanced against society's interest in the public peace."10' Thus, the
Missouri court essentially held that the interest of a secured party in the recovery
of collateral is not as strong as the public interest in peace.
This holding will protect the public, and specifically debtors, from possible
physical harm resulting from a "botched" repossession for several reasons.
Because of the possible liability arising from third party repossession, creditors
will be more likely to proceed judicially.'02 Lenders may also choose to use their
own employees rather than independent contractors to repossess collateral.' 3
This would give creditors greater control over how the repossession is
performed."° Finally, secured creditors are in the best position to evaluate
available repossession services. Robinson will cause secured creditors to be
more selective about who they hire to repossess collateral. The fact that secured
creditors will be held liable regardless of fault will lead them to hire only the
most reputable independent contractors to repossess collateral. This should keep
the unsavory repossession services from causing harm to innocent debtors and
others who may be in the wrong place at the wrong time, such as Odell
Robinson.
However, Robinson will have a negative financial impact on potential
borrowers. It will increase the cost of automobile loans and make them more
difficult to obtain. 0 5 It will make it more difficult to obtain a loan because
lenders will scrutinize the credit histories of potential borrowers more
carefully.'06 A greater degree of research will accompany any loan application
99. Id.
100. MBank El Paso, N.A. v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 152-53 (Tex. 1992).
101. Id. at 154.
102. Id. at 159. (Hecht, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. No reason exists why the Robinson holding should be limited to
automobile repossession. Repossessions resulting from defaults on furniture, stereos,
television sets, and numerous other consumer goods could also be accompanied by a
nondelegable duty not to breach the peace.
106. William M. Ucherek, II, Lenders and Borrowers Beware! Secured Creditors
May Not Avoid Liability for Breaches of the Peace by Using an Independent Contractor
to Carry Out Repossession, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 275, 293 (1993).
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for fear of default mandating repossession. Lenders may be forced to review the
grounds on which loans are approved and denied. 7 The cost of more thorough
research will be passed on to the borrower.'0 8 The decision will have a more
severe impact on "high risk" borrowers who cannot afford additional costs for
loans or who are denied loans altogether."°
This holding will also have a negative financial impact on potential
borrowers. Upon a debtor's default, a secured creditor can attempt to regain
possession of the collateral in three different ways. Lenders may chose to use
their own employees to repossess collateral."0 This gives creditors greater
control over how repossessions are performed."' However, this option may be
unavailable if the collateral is not located in a creditor's general vicinity."'
Therefore, lenders may be more reluctant to make loans secured by distant or
readily movable collateral."3
Creditors may also chose to proceed judicially.' Unfortunately,
adjudication can be a slow process, and may be too expensive to pursue. 15
judicial repossession will typically take more time than self-help repossession.
Creditors must often repossess quickly to prevent damage to the collateral or to
prevent loss in the market value of the collateral." 6 However, because of the
possible liability arising from third party repossession, creditors will be more
likely to "choose the more expensive but less risky course ofjudicial foreclosure
as the means of collecting their debts .... '1 The additional costs that result
from a creditor's decision to proceed judicially will be passed on to borrowers.
The decision will also have the detrimental effect of creating more cases for the
over-crowded courts. 18
Finally, creditors may continue to hire independent contractors to conduct
repossessions, as Citicorp did. 19 However, after Robinson, this option will not











116. Ucherek, supra note 106, at 293.
117. Mbank El Paso, N.A. v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 159 (Tex. 1992) (Hecht,
J., dissenting).
118. Ucherek, supra note 106, at 293.
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torts caused by third party repossessors. 120 In other words, lenders would
effectively become insurers for the torts committed by independent repossession
companies hired by them.'2 ' This additional cost, like so many others, will be
passed along to the consumer in the form of interest rates, finance charges, late
penalties, etc. 22  Therefore, the Robinson decision will ultimately have a
detrimental financial effect on borrowers.
23
The court, in Robinson, warned lenders that "a secured party must ensure
there is no risk of harm to the debtor and others if the secured party chooses to
repossess collateral by self-help methods."' 24 However, the court failed to
outline the precautions a creditor is expected to take when pursuing self-help
repossession. Therefore, creditors have only one absolutely safe option: judicial
repossession.
Whether lenders choose to repossess collateral using their own employees
or independent contractors, they will have to insure against breaches of the
peace. 125 This increased cost will be passed on to borrowers. 126 If a creditor
decides to play it safe and proceed judicially, the increased cost will also be
passed on to the borrower.'27 Because peaceable automobile repossession is now
a nondelegable duty, lenders will be forced to distribute increased costs to
borrowers. 28 Thus, although the rule was clearly intended to protect borrowers,
it will effectively hurt them in the long run.
VI. CONCLUSION
According to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Section 400.9-503 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes imposes a nondelegable duty on a secured creditor
pursuing self-help repossession to prevent a breach of the peace.129 Robinson
makes it less likely that the public, and specifically debtors, will be physically
harmed during a "botched" repossession. However, the holding may result in
a decrease in the availability, and an increase in the cost of loans for "high risk"
loan applicants. Secured creditors forced to pay for judicial proceedings or for
120. Ucherek, supra note 106, at 293.
121. Ucherek, supra note 106, at 293.
122. Mbank El Paso, N.A., v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 159 (Tex. 1992) (Hecht,
J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Robinson v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996).
125. Ucherek, supra note 106, at 293.
126. Ucherek, supra note 106, at 293.
127. Mbank El Paso, N.A., v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 159 (Tex. 1992) (Hecht,
J., dissenting).
128. Id.
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damage claims resulting from acts of their independent contractors may increase
the costs and decrease the number of loans they approve for borrowers who rely
most heavily on credit. Robinson implies that the buck stops at the secured
creditor, but in reality, the buck is passed to the potential borrower.
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